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Abstract
This undergraduate economics thesis is meant to find statistically significant
evidence for shirking behavior in Major League Baseball (MLB). Theory suggests
that players shirk on effort when they have recently signed a long-term lucrative
contract, since there is little incentive to compete when money is guaranteed to the
player regardless of current performance. It is particularly important to understand
the MLB labor market, since the firms giving out contracts not only have a copious
amount of production information regarding their employees, but this data is widely
available to the general public. This study will make use of modern sabermetric
statistics in order to further open up the conversation regarding shirking with
advanced statistics. It will also seek to control for other motivational forces at play,
such as intrinsic motivation of the player based on their own self-confidence, as well
as extrinsic motivation regarding the performance of the time in terms of win-loss
record. Such motivational factors had not yet been discussed within the shirking
conversation.
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Introduction
Do Major League Baseball (MLB) players exhibit less effort when they have
many years left on their contract? The MLB labor market is set up in such a way that
after signing a long-term contract, players really have no reason to play except to
earn their next contract. Does this mean that players will only exhibit maximal effort
as their contract nears expiration? Research regarding shirking behavior informs
economists regarding human behavior. Evidence of shirking would imply that
intrinsic motivation is not strong, and that the worker is entirely incentivized by
money.
Other articles regarding shirking behavior, such as those by renowned sports
economist Anthony Krautmann, set out on numerous occasions to see whether or
not shirking behavior can truly be empirically proven. Unfortunately, different
models seem to find differing results, depending on the theoretical framework
behind the model, the performance measures used, and the type of contracts
included within the sample.
This study will seek to be the first to control for intrinsic motivation in the
context of testing for shirking behavior in Major League Baseball. Effort is a direct
result of motivation, so this article contains multiple regression models that include
other motivating or demotivating controls in order to isolate the effect of the years
remaining on a player’s contract and that player’s performance.
The model that this thesis presents brings experimentation and innovation to
the literature. This article also is the first to use the sabermetric statistic Wins Above
Replacement (WAR) as the performance variable. This makes this thesis unique in
that no other paper uses a performance measure that can compare pitchers and
hitters.
Unfortunately, the models created in this study had differing results, and
shirking behavior based on contract years remaining remains empirically unproven.
Differing performance measures yielded different results, which was consistent
with other articles in the literature. More studies need to be conducted in order to
understand the WAR statistic better, as well as to establish regular measures of
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forces of motivation competing with the incentive-based motivation, such as
extrinsic and intrinsic.
The next section will provide a comprehensive literature review of shirking
behavior. Then, the next section will go over the framework for the first model. The
third section will analyze the model. The fourth section will introduce a similar
model with very slight adjustments, then compare the models. The fifth section will
do this once more, slightly adjusting the model and discussing differences. The final
section is a brief conclusion to sum up the thoughts, opinions, and lessons that the
thesis provides.
Literature Review
Sports are unique. They are among the only markets in which it is
straightforward to quantify an individual’s productivity. In addition, labor contracts
are structured in such a way where players often known almost exactly what they
are going to be paid, regardless of current performance. Rather, contracts are
negotiated based on past performance, and teams must commit guaranteed money
to players based on projections for the future. When it is put so simply, it seems
obvious that teams should commit more money and years to superior players. This
is how the market has functioned. However, this creates a classic principle-agent
dilemma, in which players function as the agents, and team owners function as
principles (Pedicelli, 2015). Once owners or executives elect to sign a player to a
long-term contract, that player no longer has an incentive to exhibit maximum effort
(assuming that exerting effort is unpleasant). Take the case of Pablo Sandoval, for
instance. Sandoval was an accomplished player and a playoff hero for the San
Francisco Giants, but after signing a 5-year, $90 million contract with the Boston
Red Sox after the 2014 season, he was consistently overweight, out of shape, and an
underperformer for the Red Sox. He was released by the Red Sox after two and a
half disappointing seasons, but he is still being paid by the team. This extreme
example exemplifies the importance of evaluating contract structures in the Major
League Baseball (MLB) labor market. Could such a circumstance been avoided? Is
there a pattern of reduced effort after the signing of a long-term contract? Sports
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economists have studied this idea of “shirking”, or making the decision to exhibit
less effort under certain circumstances. This paper will extensively analyze and
critique the existing literature on this subject to provide context for my own model
for analyzing the controversial relationship between effort and incentives in
professional sports.
A fundamental problem that arises in principle-agent relationships, outlined
by Holmstrem (1979), is the imperfect information that principles have to deal with
when designing contracts for agents. As a result, employers are expected to invest
capital into monitoring the actions of their employees in order to get a stronger
sense of individual production and to ultimately use this information to create a
labor contract (Holmstrem, 1979). Sports, specifically Major League Baseball due to
their advanced statistical measures of performance, are the finest example of this
performance monitoring, analysis, and subsequent action based on this information.
Investing as much capital as is efficient into performance monitoring is described as
a second-best solution to perfect information (Holmsrem, 1979). This behavior can
easily be observed in Major League Baseball, as advances in analytics are at the
forefront of public attention, largely beginning by the "Moneyball" approach most
famously used by Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletics in the late 1990's, which has
since been used across the league. Although complete monitoring has not yet been
achieved, Major League Baseball owners and executives continually strive towards
this ideal. This makes the MLB and other sports labor markets unique. Unlike most
firms, who are unable to invest capital heavily into monitoring, since it is so
prohibitively expensive, MLB franchises have copious amounts of money to monitor
and scout players in order to optimize labor contracts. When it comes to monitoring
players, all of whom make six, seven, eight, or even nine figures, investing into this
function is not only important, it is absolutely necessary to the success of a
franchise. Holmstrem (1979) would anticipate that near perfect monitoring would
result in contracts that actually penalize dysfunctional behavior (Holmstrem, 1979).
However, incentive based contracts are only starting to become popular recently,
and contracts that penalize poor performance do not exist. This could be due to the
power of the MLB Players Association. The unique amount of information in
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baseball specifically makes it an important market to understand. As technology, as
well as statistical power to predict and value continue to improve, monitoring
similar to that in baseball will likely become to the norm in other labor markets as
well, so the evolution of labor contracts in baseball could serve as a framework for
future contracts in other labor sectors.
In order to set the context for discussing this market inefficiency, it is
important to understand where the MLB labor market is in its evolution. Before free
agency, players had no choice but to sign contracts under the reserve clause system.
This reserve clause was in every contract, and it allowed the owner of the team to
renew a player’s contract after the previous contract expires indefinitely (Knowles
et al. 2003).
The advent of free agency brought about a shift in the balance of risk sharing.
As opposed to the team having the right to continue to renew the existing contract
of the player, free agency makes it so that teams usually do not have this
opportunity to opt out of future payments, unless of course this provision exists
within the contract. Essentially, the player is provided with assurance that he is
going to paid, and thus it can be inferred that this player will demonstrate moral
hazard.
Obviously, due to the long-term contract situation stated above, there is an
inefficiency inherent in the labor market. Luckily for MLB teams, players like to play,
and there is strong intrinsic motivation within players. If there was not, then
Giancarlo Stanton could have stopped exhibiting effort purposely after signing his
contract worth over three hundred million dollars, and the Marlins would have had
absolutely no option but to pay the man lazily sat on the bench, producing nothing
for the franchise, because he simply does not have to. This type of contract structure
would fail outright in just about any other type of business. Therefore, there must be
other forces, such as intrinsic motivation that make this inefficiency difficult to
prove econometrically. These forces must be controlled for in order to isolate the
inefficiency.
Anthony Krautmann, who writes extensively on the subject of shirking in
Major League Baseball, and John L. Solow created a study that measures changes in
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performance over the course of long-term contracts (Krautmann and Solow, 2009).
In the introduction, they state that there are many reasons to be skeptical about
whether athletes shirk (Krautmann and Solow, 2009). This is undoubtedly true. The
main argument he brings up is, however, not an argument. They ask why owners
continue to offer long-term contracts if there are perverse incentives. "Theory
suggests that incentive-compatible contracts should evolve to punish opportunistic
behavior" (Krautmann and Solow, 2009). In this statement, Krautmann and Solow
fail to acknowledge that we are not indeed in the long run. Free agency has only
existed for fifty years in the MLB, and in that time, contracts have changed
significantly, but the information-gathering phase is far from complete. Theories
often assert that there is a long-run equilibrium that we trend towards, but in this
case, the long-run equilibrium or trend, perfect information, is impossible to
achieve. To ever assume that the market has already achieved long-run equilibrium
status is a lofty assumption, and in this case, it is actually impossible, since no one
knows what a player will contribute at the time that the team official and the player
agree to the terms of the contract, given the current contract structure in which
salaries are determined before performance. Perhaps contracts will evolve to
punish opportunistic behavior more effectively, but the mere fact that they have not
yet is not an argument that disputes the phenomenon.
This faulty assumption is important for the actual model itself in that the
model does not control for other motivational factors that guide the athlete to not
shirk (or to shirk). As stated previously, the contract structure undoubtedly does,
theoretically, leave athletes in a situation in which they do not need to exert
unpleasant effort to make large sums of money. This idea needs to be isolated in
order to be proven empirically. Other factors, such as intrinsic motivational factors,
such as gaining fan support, winning a world series, earning the respect of
teammates and the media, etc. are not considered in the model and thus cause it to
be biased.
Faulty assumptions aside, it is time to analyze the model for what it is. The
model is centralized around the idea that there is evidence of shirking when actual
performance deviates significantly below expected performance. The model tests
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for changes in expected adjusted OPS and actual adjusted OPS (adjusted OPS is
simply a common sabermetric statistic used to evaluate the production of hitters)
over the course of long-term contracts. Note that this does not include pitchers. The
model executes this test in multiple steps. They first estimate the relationship
between performance and experience in order to create expectations for how a
player will perform when they exert maximum effort. They only consider players in
their walk year in order to avoid a bias, as they assume that players not in their walk
year will not exert maximal effort due to their hypothesis (Krautmann and Solow,
2009). They also necessarily used a vector of various controls. Next, they calculated
the players’ shirk value as the difference between expected and actual performance
(Krautmann and Solow, 2009). Moving right along, they then estimate the
probability that the current contract is the player’s last (Krautmann and Solow,
2009). This contrasts with other models that only look at the ex post result of
retirement. This idea is better because the player has not necessarily made the
decision to retire in the middle of the season, but they are certainly aware of the
likelihood that they make this decision in the future. This is one of the particularly
brilliant aspects of the paper. Lastly, they estimate the relationship between the
shirk variable and the amount of years remaining on the player’s contract to
ultimately acquire their results (Krautmann and Solow, 2009).
The results assert that players who have a high probability of retiring at the
conclusion of the contract exhibit less effort (Krautmann and Solow, 2009). They
also found that players in their walk years play better than their projections
(Krautmann and Solow, 2009). They also found that the coefficient of the years
remaining variable was positive and significant, showing that players do in fact
exert more effort when they have less time left on their contracts. Overall, this is a
highly complex, successful model, one that sets the standard for all over models
based on shirking behavior in Major League Baseball.
Another model involving Krautmann, this time in tandem with Donley,
looked at shirking through two different definitions of productivity. One of them
was of course marginal physical product, focusing on what the player is able to
provide in terms of production on the field (Krautmann and Donley, 2009). The
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other model within the study was centered on marginal revenue product. The one
using marginal physical product also used OPS, but the projections were formed
using production from the prior three years, which obviously differs from the
projection process in the model already discussed. This model yielded results that
were not statistically significant (Krautmann and Donley, 2009). Unfortunately, the
authors provide no possible explanations as to why this may be, especially since
Krautmann was involved in the paper discussed above that did find statistically
significant results. Unfortunately, he offers no comparisons. The performance
measure differs between the two studies very slightly, as the former study utilizes a
more advanced sabermetric statistic called adjusted OPS, whereas this one uses the
normal OPS statistic that has been around for over a hundred years. Perhaps a
reason for this is the lack of a variable controlling for the player’s retirement
probability. A potential problem with this model is that it uses a simple control for
age, as a linear relationship between age and performance is not likely to exist in
linear form, as there is more likely to have a parabolic relationship between these
variables. Therefore, functional form may be a problem throwing the results off.
Another potential problem with the model is that the three years prior to the
signing of a new contract may be biased downwards, as those years immediately
preceding a contract carry high incentive to perform to maximum potential. This
potential problem was discussed in the previous paper, but not this one. It is also
not the cause of the insignificant coefficient values, since one would expect that bias
to be in the direction that would favor more significant results
The model using marginal revenue product as the value standard brings an
interesting twist to the literature. Marginal revenue product refers to the amount of
revenue that a player generates. Expected marginal revenue product is logically
assumed to be the negotiated salary for the player due to free-market bidding, while
actual marginal revenue product requires calculation. They did so by estimating the
team’s run differential (runs scored minus runs allowed), then using this to estimate
a quadratic revenue function. Using this approach, the authors were able to find
significant results (Krautmann, 1990). The author offered numerous explanations as
to why this may be the case, such as synergies between players and teams that
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consistently overpay. More research needs to be done in order to validate these
explanations. In my opinion, the expected marginal revenue product being equal to
the salary is true, but assuming that these expectations being realistic and accurate
is difficult. These expectations should logically shift as more data is acquired, but
contract structures do not allow for these shifts to be reflected in the model. In
actuality, outlooks on players can shift within a year or two, so in the context of
long-term contracts, which often exceed four years, these expectations are
incredibly dated. Also, this assumption is faulty in that teams tend to structure
contracts so that the salary is “back loaded”. There are numerous reasons that teams
back load contracts, such as acquiring the player in their prime for less than they are
worth, allowing the team to have more current money to spend on other players, as
well as assuming higher future revenues and lower luxury tax limits, etc. The fact of
the matter is that team’s pay players more than they expect them to be worth at the
end of the contract, so this could inflate the shirk variable for the end of contracts
that are back loaded.
Another article brings up the randomness of production in professional
sports. Krautmann offers an explanation dispelling the lack of incentive hypothesis
centered around the randomness of productivity in professional baseball. It is clear
that there is some degree of randomness and luck involved (Krautmann, 1990), but
this explanation does not sit particularly well. This is especially true in a sport like
baseball, where the sample size is normally around 162 games (a full season) and
around 600 plate appearances, a large sample size as opposed to say football, which
has only 16 game seasons.
In the conclusion, Krautmann cites the complexity of contracts as a reason
that the disincentive problem does not exist without providing a theoretical basis
for this claim (Krautmann, 1990). What complexity is he referring to? He fails to
provide any sort of examples of how certain provisions may cancel out the
disincentive problem. He may be referring to team or player options to opt out of
the contract, but one could easily leave these contracts out of the sample. He may
also be referring to incentive bonuses that are becoming more and more prevalent
in contracts. However, these incentives, in almost all cases, only represent a
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relatively small percentage of the overall value of the contract. Again, these are easy
to keep out of the sample.
A response by Scoggins points out a very valid and distinct problem with this
Krautmann article. Scoggins decided to run the exact same regression, except
altering the performance measure ever so slightly, from slugging average to total
bases (Scoggins, 1993). Slugging average is simply total bases per at-bat, so I must
stress how small of a change that this is to the original regression model (Scoggins,
1993). This miniscule change allowed Scoggins to reject the null hypothesis that
shirking does not occur. This stresses the importance of testing using multiple
different performance measures in analysis.
It is frustrating that Krautmann does extensive research in multiple different
ideas that are prevalent in sports economics issues without combining them into a
model that encompasses multiple factors. He simply does his best to isolate certain
effects, and he does not connect his articles in order to gain any conclude-able or
useful findings.
Another article, this one by Maxcy et al. (2002) postulates that both ex ante
strategic behavior and ex post opportunistic shirking behavior both take place in
Major League Baseball. Therefore, they run a regression testing the performance of
players who are in close proximity to a new contract, either about to signed, or just
having been signed. They use a control for the average performance of the player
three years prior as a proxy for expected performance, then compare that to the
performance either just before or just after a contract was signed (Maxcy et al.,
2002). The performance metric used was slugging average for hitters and strikeout
to walk ratio for pitchers. Obviously, these differing measurements mean that the
pitchers and hitters must be compared separately. They also use a dummy variable
for both the first and last year in the contract, which I found to be very interesting,
since it allows them to isolate the effects of the two most extreme years for both
opportunistic behavior strategic maximal effort behavior. The study found evidence
of ex ante opportunistic behavior, by finding that time spent on the Disabled List
and playing time is significantly higher immediately preceding contract negotiations
(Maxcy et al., 2002). They were unable to find any evidence that performance was
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higher before a new contract, or lower after a new contract for either pitchers or
hitters.
An economist by the name of Katie Stankiewicz (2009) takes on a different
approach. Stankiewicz (2009) decided to compare the production players under
multiyear contracts and one-year contracts in order to show that players on oneyear contracts are more productive than those with multiple year contracts
(Stankewicz, 2009). This is problematic in that players with long-term contracts are
inherently better players, as teams will only be willing to commit multiple years to a
player if that player is a well above-average player. Her model is very simply and
only has controls for age, games played, and coach’s success, the latter of which is
largely inconsequential in the world of baseball. She made no attempt to control for
the talent of the players involved. Unsurprisingly, she found that players with longterm contracts out-performed those on one-year contracts, meaning that the sign of
her one-year contract was negative instead of the positive sign that she expected
(Stankewicz, 2009).
Stankewicz also expanded upon this paper by looking at average productivity
of players with four-year contracts in each individual year of the contract. This
means that she averaged all sample players’ performance in the first year of the
contract, the second year, etc., even including the year right before the contract was
signed (Stankewicz, 2009). She concluded that since average performance did not
increase in year four, then shirking could not be shown to have taken place. This is
problematic for many reasons, the largest of which being that she did not use any
controls, not even for age. Since players can only enter free agency once they have
six years of major league experience, players are often on the second half of their
career and declining by the time these long-term contracts are signed, so age would
be expected to have a negative sign.
One thing that Stankewicz did do that was interesting is that she used a
sabermetric statistic EqA as her performance variable, which is shorthand for
equivalent average per out. This statistic adjusts performance for variables such as
home ballpark of the player and level of pitching that the player faced against. The

12

statistic also includes base-running value, which is often ignored in the literature,
for example by OPS, adjusted OPS, and slugging average.
The glaring, overarching theme in the literature regarding shirking behavior
in Major League Baseball is that economists disagree about whether it is provable.
Some believe that the evidence of shirking is sufficient to prove the relationship
between contract length and effort exists in the way that the shirking hypothesis
expects, while others are unconvinced. The models that have been created are often
very susceptible to minor changes, as these minor changes can drastically alter the
conclusions that the model makes. These changes can be either controls or
statistical measures used to aggregate performance.
Another problem with the existing literature is that all of the studies look
exclusively at hitters, while almost none consider pitchers. Pitchers play
considerably less games than hitters do, but it is incredibly difficult for pitchers to
keep themselves sufficiently healthy and strong to compete at the Major League
level. This is due to the repeated torque that a starting pitcher puts on his arm over
the course of a season. This is not to say that it is easier for hitters to sustain
themselves than it is for pitchers, but ignoring half of the game when it comes to
shirking behavior seems to be an oversight.
They also rarely account for other incentive forces that are compelling
players to not shirk. The more sophisticated models have been able to find evidence
of shirking, at least in certain performance measures. Surprisingly, all of these
articles, despite having been written in the twenty-first century, used statistical
measures for performance that would be considered archaic strategies for
aggregating production. There are numerous sabermetric statistics that are far more
generally accepted nowadays in their goal of aggregating player value than slugging
average or OPS. The only measures that were at all modern were the marginal
revenue product estimate in Krautmann and Donley (2009), and the equivalent
average technique used in the Stankewicz (2009) article. None used wins above
replacement (which is similar to the marginal revenue product estimate), which was
shocking due to its prevalence in sports media coverage of players. It is widely cited
by MVP voters as a driving reason behind voters’ decision making.
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Also, there is no mention as to how the models account for various types of
options that are often in MLB contracts. These options include player, team, mutual,
and vesting options. Player options are also called opt-outs, so player’s can sign
contracts in which before a certain year in the contract, they can choose to not
exercise the rest of the contract and become free agents. Team options are the same
except the team can nullify the contract. In mutual options, both parties must agree
to the terms or else the player becomes a free agent. In vesting option, the player
will become a free agent unless they have reached a certain threshold; these options
are by far the least common of the four.
Since the model about to be discussed also attempts to control for player
confidence, it is important to outline past research that has been conducted
regarding confidence. Feltz (1988) outlined the major frameworks that sports
economists have used to study confidence.
The first theoretical approach to studying self-confidence in sports is through
self-efficacy. Bandura’s theory of self-efficacy refers to the judgments of what an
individual can do with the skills he or she possesses, and this directly impacts the
effort and conviction one has to successfully executive a behavior required to
produce a desired outcome (Feltz, 1988). This is the exact type of effort that I want
to be able to control for in my model. Expectation of person efficacy come from four
sources, personal accomplishments, vicarious experiences, verbal persuasion, and
physical arousal, and performance accomplishments are the most dependable
source of information to determine an individuals self-efficacy (Feltz, 1988).
However, it should be mentioned that this brings validity to Stankewicz’ (2009)
control of coach’s success in her model, despite it not being the most effective way
to determine an individual player’s confidence.
It is also important to look at other sports, when discussing shirking behavior
in professional sports. The National Football League has a slightly different labor
market, as the contracts are much more incentive based than in Major League
Baseball. Marks (2017) created a model in which he looked at all NFL players in the
same sample, including different positions with dummy variables to characterize
them. He found that players with new, long-term contracts performed worse on a
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sabermetric point scale created by Pro Football Focus, but not to a statistically
significant degree. This model sets the precedent that it is highly difficult to compare
players amongst different positions in the same sport. He did not run any
regressions only using players of a certain position, giving himself a larger sample
than just the 2015 season. Like most models looking at shirking behavior, Marks
(2017) used age and age-squared as variables of controls. He also used the
performance in the previous year as a basis for comparison for his model. He
compared players’ performance to their performance the previous year, citing the
difference between these two values as his dependent variable. Like other models,
Marks (2017) focuses on whether or not the player had just signed a new, long-term
contract.
Shirking is also extensively studied in European soccer. The journal article,
Feess et al. (2010) assesses the effectiveness of long-term contracts as incentives,
much like all of the other relevant articles, except this one looks at the Bundesliga,
the top tier soccer league in Germany. Much like my own data, this article collected
its information by hand, from a magazine in this case. Also like my own models,
Feess et al. (2010) are aware of their own selection bias in selecting their sample.
While their issues stem from selecting only long-term contracts, mine stems from
only considering free-agent contracts and ignoring contracts of players that are still
under the reserve system. They also used a number of interesting controls, such as
whether the player was on the national team, age, number of games, whether the
previous contract was “renewed” (which cannot happen to players in my samples),
or whether the previous contract was allowed to expire. The idea behind this is that
a player who has had their contract renewed has earned the favor of ownership for
some reason, whereas allowing a contract to expire can signal unfulfilled
expectations or low talent (Feess, et al., 2010). Feess, et al. (2010) were actually able
to find highly significant results using this framework, showing strong evidence of
shirking associated with people who had signed long-term contracts.
Lastly, shirking is also studied in the National Basketbal Association (NBA).
Jean (2010) looks at the long-term contract and ex post shirking behavior and ex
ante opportunistic behavior, very similar to Maxcy et al. (2002) journal on baseball.
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This just goes to show how widespread and well studied this framework is. Like
Maxcy et al. (2002), Jean (2010) was unable to find significant results of shirking
behavior using this framework. Jean (2010) however, does raise an important point
that I am trying to make in his conclusion, that there may be a variety of
confounding factors that prevent these shirking behaviors to be detectable. My
study will attempt to control for some of these confounding factors within the
framework.
The First Model
For the model, the goal was to directly show a correlation between wins
above replacement (WAR) for a player and the years left on that player’s contract
during that season. In order to find this relationship, the sample and the controls for
the model are of course extremely important. This next section will detail how the
sample and controls were chosen and what they were intended to do in the model.
For the sample, the goal was to be as inclusive as possible. The players
selected were those on free agent deals, and the seasons that were considered were
the 2016 and 2017 seasons. The sample was fairly large as compared to the samples
used in the existing literature. The information was gathered using information
from spotrac, baseball reference, and fangraphs. I chose to leave out catchers and
relief pitchers, as these players play significantly less than other position players
and starting pitchers, even when healthy. They likely could have been included
without significantly impacting results, but I chose to leave them out due to the fact
that they do play and contribute less. Leaving these players out posed no risk for the
results of the paper, but I feared leaving them in the model would cause distribution
of the WAR statistic to be too heavily concentrated around zero, leading to strong
heteroskedasticity. That said, I was able to use nearly all of the players on veteran
contracts for the model that were neither catchers nor relief pitchers. There are a
few missing due to difficulty in acquiring certain contract data, which necessitated
that I pay for the data. Also, I left out players whose contracts were comprised
almost entirely or entirely of option years, such as the case of David Price’s contract
with the Red Sox and Clayton Kershaw’s contract with the Dodgers. I ended up with
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188 observations in total, which is more than sufficient based on the sample sizes of
the existing literature.
Also, instead of using a SHIRK variable that represents the disparity between
actual performance and expected performance, this model simply looks at the
relationship between the years remaining on the contract and a performance
measure. This is where it becomes important to control for motivational factors and
talent, which is the biggest challenge taken on by this model, and these controls will
be discussed in detail in a moment. The goal was to keep the framework as simple
and easy to analyze as possible, while also planning on acquiring robust results.
Here is what my initial regression equation came out to:
WARi=0i+1iADJGAMES+2iYRSLEFT+3iLOGSALARY+4iLOGTMONEY+

5iPREVREC+6iRECORD+6iLASTYEAR+7iAGE+8iAGE2+9iIMPROVE
The performance measure used in the initial model is different from those in
other models. I chose WAR (using the fangraphs definition, specifically) as the
performance measure for multiple reasons. WAR estimates the number of wins that
the player contributed over the course of a season compared to a replacement level
player for that season. First, WAR takes into account performance of all aspects of
the game, including base-running, fielding, and hitting for positions players, and
pitching and fielding for pitchers. It even adjusts what performance level
characterizes a replacement level player year by year, accounting for the evolution
of the average replacement level player as the years go on. Since this study only uses
2016 and 2017 statistics, it is unlikely that this benefit is going to make any
difference. Nonetheless, it provides a very complete aggregation of a player’s
performance. Other studies often use measure like batting average, slugging
percentage, or on-base percentage plus slugging percentage. These measures only
look at hitting, ignoring fielding and base running, which are two very important
components of a player’s contribution to the game. This is the only piece in the
literature that uses WAR as its performance measure. WAR also controls for other
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factors, such as the home ballpark factor, which is important since the dimensions
and altitude of the ballpark contribute to the player’s production and players play
half of their games at their home ballpark. EqA, used by Stankewicz (2009), also
takes into account a lot of these same variables, so this article uses a similarly
modern performance statistic. Her measure did not include defense, however, only
offense. The ballpark controls are important because a ball in Denver, Colorado
simply goes farther than it will in other ballparks due to thinner air at extreme
altitude. Therefore, players on the Colorado Rockies will have statistics that are
biased upwards since half of their games were in Coors Field. WAR takes a hitterfriendly or pitcher-friendly environment into account on both the hitter side of
things and the pitcher. There are endless examples like this one that allow for more
advanced, comprehensive player comparison using WAR. WAR also allows us to
include pitchers in the model, which is an important differentiator of the model,
since pitchers are essentially the other half of the game and are completely lacking
from the literature on shirking behavior.
The other most important variable is the number of years remaining on the
player’s contract, YEARSLEFT. These were collected on spotrac.com, which is a good
resource for acquiring contract information in many sports. Similar variables were
used in all of the models in the literature review in one step or another, although
this regression is done in one step. The years left variable is very simply the total
number of years in the contract minus the number of completed seasons on the
contract, not including player option seasons, team option seasons, mutual option,
and vesting option seasons. Other models did not say how they treated these
seasons, but I chose to omit them entirely. These options may present an issue in the
model, as they present a whole host of different relationship dynamics between the
player and team that may affect the player’s effort decisions depending on the
player’s perception of the salary in the option. Meaning, if a player has the right to
opt out of a contract but feels that they are being overpaid, then they may have
similar behavior to a player that has many years left on the contract, but a player
with a player option in which they believe the salary to be too low, then they may
behave as though they are in a contract year. It may have been conceivably possible
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to determine a probability that certain options would be exercised, and so these
years could be considered in the model, but this model does not do so. Such an
adjustment would be similar to the Krautmann and Donley (2009) retirement
probability metric that they used instead of an ex post retirement variable.
The next variable is adjusted games played, ADJGAMES. The variable is there
in order to control for players that missed games over the course of the season,
which is usually due to injury or personal family emergencies. Adjusted games
played is simply games played for position players. For starting pitchers, I
multiplied games started by five, since starting pitchers pitch every five games for
the most part. There are a few pitchers who got extra starts due to timely off-days in
the team’s schedule, but having a few adjusted games played numbers as higher
than the 162 game season is unlikely to create any significant problems for the
model. It is also possible that a hitter can play more innings than the amount of
games they played times 9 due to extra innings, which are the baseball equivalent to
overtime, so this more or less evens out due to this aspect of the game.
I also felt it necessary to control for the player’s SALARY for the season. Since
the player’s in this study vary greatly in their overall production, there needs to be a
way to control for how talented the player is. Since salary is determined by past
production, we can assume that players with higher salaries have higher expected
performance, so this variable attempts to put players on even ground. This may be
problematic in that players with higher salaries have more incentive to shirk, as
players who are not being paid as much of an astronomical sum may need to earn
further contracts in the future in order to retire comfortably, since players likely
have the goal to live out the rest of their lives without again entering the workforce,
and professional athletes retire at a far earlier age than nearly all other professions.
Also, the initial model has a dummy variable that equals one if the player
retires after the season, LASTYEAR. These players do not have the incentive to earn
their next contract, since they are not going to be playing the next year. It would
have been ideal to have a variable for retirement probability as in the model from
Krautmann and Solow (2009) but for the purposes of this study, the ex post dummy
variable is likely sufficient.
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The model also controls for the team’s record in both the season before and
the season itself, PREVREC and RECORD. The record from the season before is used
in order to adjust for the team’s confidence going into the season. Presumably,
teams that were good the previous year will feel confidence in their ability to
improve and to ultimately compete for a title. Thus, a higher record will result in
higher production. Record from the season itself works similarly, but it also
accounts for how the team has changed since the previous year. Controls for
extrinsic motivation are key here, extrinsic motivation is a key force opposing the
lack of motivation associated with shirking.
Similar to other studies, this one also controls for AGE and AGE2. As players
get older their performance diminishes, so these variables control for these effects.
AGE2 is important since the relationship between age and performance is quadratic.
As a player ages, they will improve for a time until they reach peak performance,
also known as the player’s prime, then they will regress after this point as they age
and gradually lose their physical tools.
The regression also controls for talent with salary and total money
committed to the player, LOGSALARY and LOGTMONEY. Players with more money
committed and higher salaries are historically better player, so one would assume
that higher salaries produce more. It is extremely important to control for talent
because the study is not concerning fluctuations in performance over time, rather it
tests for indicators of performance that are consistent between a wide variety of
players. I took the log of salary and the log of total money committed so that the
coefficients would represent the change in performance based on a percent increase
in salary and money earned. This is more appropriate because the incremental value
of a dollar is negligible and much more difficult to read as a miniscule coefficient.
Since Stankewicz (2009) found that players with longer term contracts
perform better on the whole than players on one-year contracts and Krautmann and
Oppenheiemr (2002) found that players with longer contracts generally have higher
salaries, it can be inferred that higher salaries and higher total money can be
associated with higher talent levels. Obviously, this is only true amongst players that
have already hit free agency, since players that have not yet hit free agency are paid
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far less than they are worth if they have superstar level talent. This is not a problem
in this study, since we only consider players veteran players that have been able to
negotiate their contracts after establishing their talent.
The last variable is a variable that accounts for the player’s individual
confidence level and overall career trend called IMPROVE. The variable is a dummy
that equals one if the player’s WAR in the season preceding the observation is higher
than their average WAR. This is a key variable in the model, since we are trying to
control for other types of motivation for a player in order to isolate the effects on
motivation and effort of the amount of years left on the contract. I have chosen to
focus the confidence measure on self-efficacy, since it can be most easily measured
by making this comparison between past performance and average performance. It
is also easiest to measure, since it is largely based on past performance. Some may
argue that this value will almost always be negative if a player got injured the
previous year, and thus the player did not really underperform in that year.
However, I think this circumstance makes sense in the framework, as players may
not trust their bodies as much, particularly the part that was injured, in the season
following an injury. This player may not lose confidence in their abilities, exactly,
but they still may lose confidence in their bodies’ ability to maintain when exerting
maximal effort. This would cause them to be cautious about exerting maximum
effort.
Analysis of the First Model
Despite these controls, the model did not find the relationship between years
left on the contract and the performance of the player that was expected. In fact, the
years left on the contract variable had a positive sign, which was significant at the
one-percent level, which was not at all expected and is extremely perplexing. This
could be due to a variety of factors to be discussed in this section.
Surprisingly, neither of the logs of salary nor total money committed were
statistically significant. This suggests that this variable did not do what it was set out
to do, which was to control for player talent. Obviously, a player with more talent is
expected to outperform a player with inferior talent. The only things that would
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explain a player with more talent having lower productivity are that they played
fewer games, yet there was not a lot of variation in this variable in the model, they
were shirking, which there was no evidence of based on the model, on the contrary,
there is evidence of the opposite, or if the player had begun to regress, yet we find
that age and age-squared both had insignificant results. The total money coefficient
even had a negative sign, suggesting that this relationship flat out does not exist, yet
no conclusions can be drawn due to a lack of significant results. Other studies did
not need to control for talent, but this study clearly does, as it does not create a shirk
variable based on the difference between expected and realized production.
It also needs a talent control because there are so few restrictions on the
sample size. Just because a player has no remaining years on his contract of course
does not mean that they are going to outperform the very finest players in baseball
who just so happen to have more years left on their contract. There needs to be an
effective control that can account for this talent differential, so that we can observe
the isolated effect of the amount of years remaining on the contract. Having more
years left on the contract certainly would not increase a player’s performance, but
since the model fails to control for talent differentials between players on long-term
and short-term contracts, we observe this positive sign. This leads me to believe that
it would be prudent to scrap these variables and to find one that better controls for
player talent. It is clear that salary and guaranteed money will not work, so
something based on past production seems to be a better idea.
The finding that total guaranteed money and salary are not effective controls
for talent is surprising. Maxcy (2004) determined that not only do superior players
get longer contracts, but also bigger salaries. Therefore higher salaries and more
guaranteed money would presumably be correlated with talent and performance,
yet this is not found to be the case in this study. Krautmann and Oppenheimer
(2002) can explain this phenomenon with their empirical conclusion that contract
length and return on performance are inversely related. This suggests a trade off
that occurs, in which players are willing to accept less money for their performance
when negotiating a long-term deal (Krautmann and Oppenheimer, 2002). Meaning,
if a player’s performance is held constant, they will receive more money per year on
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a short-term deal than on a long-term deal. I may have created a bias in my own
model here. If players with high salaries also have longer term contracts, and are
thus more likely to have more years left on their contracts, then those players may
be more likely to shirk as a whole, biasing the entire talent control downwards.
AGE and AGE2 were also surprisingly insignificant. This could be due to a
fairly small sample size. Many players in the sample were able to produce for a
longer time than most players do. At the same time, there were many players who
regressed in their early thirties. This is not to say that any specific player improved
as they aged deep into his thirties, but rather that some players started to regress
earlier than others. Since there is no set age where players will start to regress, we
observe insignificant results. If the model used a data set with a thousand or more
players, then the significance level would likely rise. Despite the insignificant pvalue, the age variable should remain in the model, if for no other reason, because it
is a pervasive variable in the literature on shirking behavior. It is possible that this
variable is insignificant because pitchers and hitters begin to regress at different
times. Pitchers may regress earlier on the whole than hitters, so hitters with higher
ages and WAR values may be skewing the results. Also, it makes sense that the
coefficients of the two AGE variables are negative, since all of the players in the
study have all hit the free agency market already. This means that they have six
years of experience in Major League Baseball already. Therefore, we would not
expect them to continue to improve, since they have likely already hit their prime.
ADJGAMES had a coefficient that was highly significant and positive, so this
variable likely did the job of controlling for the amount of time on the field during
the course of the season. This is encouraging, since this is the only model to include
both pitchers and hitters in the same model, and controlling for the amount of time
on the field is pivotally important in models trying to explain performance with
counting statistics.
The IMPROVE dummy variable proved to be significant and positive, as
expected. This can be interpreted as the confidence from the strong previous year
carried into the next season and caused helped that player continue upon their
above-average performance. This suggests that the self-efficacy control that I
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created based on the analysis of Bandura’s self-efficacy theory found in Feltz (2002)
turned out to be effective, which is a major victory for the model. More research
should be done regarding self-efficacy as a driver for productivity, especially so in
order to find even better controls for intrinsic motivation to be used in studies such
as this one.
I also conducted robustness checks in the model. Multicollinearity was a
slight issue between LOGSALARY and LOGTMONEY, but neither vif score exceeded
five, so the problem was not significant enough to fear a significant skewing of
results. Consult Table 2 to see the vif results from STATA. Heteroskedasticity was a
more significant issue, as the chi2 value was significant on a one-percent level. Based
on the other models that I ran for this thesis, I postulate that this heteroskedasticity
had something to do with the performance measure, WAR. I am not entirely sure
why this is, but both of my regressions using WAR had this issue, while the one I did
using OPS did not have this issue whatsoever.
My study is far more general than the other studies. What I mean by this is
that the study does not look at any specific circumstance, like at players who just
signed a new contract or players who are about to hit free agency. Rather, the study
simply looks at all players who have hit free agency and how their performance is
effected by how many years they have remaining on their contract. For this reason,
this study requires some creative controls that have not been tested before to my
knowledge. Unfortunately, the existing published literature does not go into detail
about what their vectors of controls entail, they just simply state that they used
vectors of controls in the model.
I would feel more confident in asserting that years left remaining on the
contract and production do not have an inverse relationship if there were far more
data points, despite the fact that the p-value is significant at a one-percent level.
Also, some of the variables have the unanticipated sign, suggesting that they fail to
control for the phenomenon that they are intended to control for. The previous
record variable, for example, actually has a negative sign. One would expect that a
stronger previous record would have the effect of improving morale of the team,
thus improving performance. However, there are arguments that would suggest that
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this sign makes perfect sense. Perhaps a strong record the previous year could
provoke complacency in players, for example. This argument is very basic and not
fleshed-out enough to really satisfy me, however. Also, the negative coefficient on
PREVREC is not statistically significant, so this is likely just a statistical fluke.
All imperfections of the model aside, it is also entirely possible that the
relationship between years left on the contract and a player’s performance really is
insignificant, since there is a lot of disagreement regarding previous results. Perhaps
players simply shirk when they sign a lucrative new contract, as was suggested by
Scoggins’ (1993) response to Krautmann (1990), and therefore players with high
salaries do not perform statistically significantly better than players who are not
paid as much. Perhaps Krautmann and Solow (2009) found that players in their
walk years outperformed those not in their walk years, but only because of a
different phenomenon than consciously shirking. Perhaps players are able to push
themselves into unsustainable production when they know that it counts the most,
similar to a mother lifting a car off a child when she knows she has to. The mother
cannot sustain the amazing strength, but it can be achieved for a relatively short
period of time. Really, there is no strong evidence that a player begins to work
harder as they near the end of their contract, which would need to be the case in
order for my model to find statistically significant results.
While this model did not yield the results that were expected, I did learn a lot
from this model based on what I did wrong. Also, the model contributes to the
literature in that it introduces the idea of controlling for factors that are inherently
difficult to control for, such as intrinsic and team motivation levels. Such work will
hopefully spark others to search for more effective controls in these respects. Since I
do not have the confidence to conclude that shirking does not exist, I took it upon
myself to try to improve the model and to find better controls in order to find this
relationship.
The Second Model
In order to improve upon the model, I made a minor adjustment to the
aforementioned regression. Unfortunately, it is evident that the logs of salary and
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total money were unable to control for player talent. If they were, then we would be
able to observe positive and significant results, which is not the case. In fact, we can
observe in the first table of results that the log of total money actually had a negative
coefficient. The adjustment was to replace these two variables with an average WAR
variable. Average WAR would in theory be able to control for the talent exhibited by
the player over the course of their contract.
The second model is as follows:
WARi=0+1iADJGAMES+2iYRSLEFT+3iAVGWAR+4iIMPROVE+5iRECORD+

5iPREVREC+6iLASTYEAR+7iAGE+8iAGE2
Refer to Table 4 for complete results. Note that the only difference here is the
omission of the log of salary and the log of total money variables.
The model revealed positive and significant results to a one-percent
significance level for the new control, AVGWAR (average WAR), which was
encouraging. However, the model again fails to garner a negative sign for the
YRSLEFT variable, which was highly disappointing, but not totally unexpected. It
seems that even when we have an effective variable of performance, we are unable
to find the results that we expect.
The with problem average WAR is that it could be skewed downward due to
missed time on the field. If a player spends a significant amount of time on the
Disabled List, then they are very likely to have a low WAR value for that season. This
contrasts with statistics like OPS, where this is not a problem. In fact, OPS could be
far too high or low than is representative of the player, since the sample size is so
low and thus the variability is much higher than statistics usually are. WAR per
game or WAR per plate appearance would have been better, but I did not consider
this until time ran too thin.
The Third and Final Model
After the results still did not come out in a way consistent with the literature,
it became evident that I needed to change my performance variable to a more
conventional metric used in the literature. There were also considerable
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heteroskedasticity problems in these first two models including WAR, see Table 2
and Table 5 for the chi2 values and significance levels. I landed on OPS, which I think
is a more complete representation of value than slugging average, which was also
taken under strong consideration. OPS refers to slugging average added to on base
percentage, which I think is better than simply slugging average because walks are
so important in the game of baseball, and they reflect advanced abilities of the
hitters to tell balls from strikes. Slugging average of course encompasses a hitter’s
ability to get extra base hits, also known as power. It was time to go back to basics,
as the WAR variable did not yield expected results, so I wanted to see if the model’s
significance levels would change like Krautmann’s (1990) did when Scoggins (1993)
changed the performance metric. I ended up with this equation:
OPSi=0+1iGames+2iYrsleft+3iCops+4iConfidence+5iRecord+5iPrevrec+

6iLastYear+7iAge+8iAge2
Since I am now using a hitting statistic, OPS, I had to drop all of the pitchers
from my sample, leaving me with a still sufficient 102 observations. It was not
possible to compare the batters’ OPS with the pitchers’ opposing OPS, since a high
OPS would be considered good performance for a hitter and a bad performance for a
pitcher. COPS (career OPS) replaces AVGWAR. CONFIDENCE is much the same as
IMPROVE in the previous regressions in that CONFIDENCE equals zero if the
previous year’s OPS is lower than their career average, and it is one if the OPS in the
previous year was higher than their career average. This controls for self-confidence
in much the same way as IMPROVE.
OPS unfortunately had the same heteroskedasticity issues that the WAR
model had; see Table 8 for the results of the test. Luckily, heteroskedasticity does
not bias the results, so any incorrect signs cannot be attributed to this issue with the
error terms being correlated with a variable. Multicollinearity was not an issue
whatsoever, and this can be confirmed in Table 9.
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Unfortunately, only two of the variables had statistically significant results in
the final model, COPS and RECORD. They had the positive signs that were
anticipated. One other positive from this model was that the YEARSLEFT variable
had a negative coefficient. It was extremely small and insignificant, but it was the
only “correct” or expected negative coefficient that I was able to achieve in any of
the models.
Conclusion
This study was unfortunately unable to provide statistically significant
evidence of shirking behavior in Major League Baseball. This is likely due to my lack
of information regarding what is standard in the literature when it comes to vectors
of controls. It also may have been due with the WAR statistic in some fashion, but
there must be a way to find the shirking relationship (if it really exists, there is no
consensus on this matter) with WAR as the performance measure. WAR is widely
regarded as a successful, representative measure of player value of Major League
Baseball players, so there is no reason that this measure is simply immune to the
phenomenon. The results that I got were very frustrating, and I would welcome any
critique regarding a more apt way to find this relationship.
These models also raise some interesting questions, for example, how player
options and team options affect a player’s performance. It would be fascinating to
have a dummy variable for if the player was over or underpaid, going into the option
year and how that affects performance and likelihood that the player’s option would
be picked up. A player who believes himself to be underpaid during an option
season would perceive themselves to essentially be in a contract season, whereas
someone who perceives themselves to be overpaid in an option season in which
they retain control of the option would be essentially the same as a long-term
contract. Proving this empirically would be quite interesting. This would be
relatively easy to do, as many different models have estimated the value of wins, so
one can compare this number to their WAR and salary to create a dummy variable
for the player is overpaid or underpaid.
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More research needs to be done regarding pitchers as well. Since Marks
(2017) was able to compare different positions in football, including comparisons
between offensive, defensive, and special teams players in the same model, it seems
like a logical next step to compare hitters and pitchers in baseball as well, regardless
of their differences in skill set. Perhaps using a WAR per game played statistic would
have been a more apt performance measure than either of the two performance
measures used in my first two models. WAR is among the most important and most
well cited statistics in baseball, so more work needs to be done to incorporate this
statistic and understand its place in sports economics. It is very curious to me that
simply changing my performance measure from WAR to OPS changed the sign of my
years left variable. Why was I getting the wrong sign in the first place? It would have
been interesting to have included dummy variables if it was the final year in the
player’s contract, and the first year of the player’s contract, just like the Maxcy et al.
(2002) paper.
On the positive side of this thesis, I was able to find a statistically significant
relationship between a team’s record during that year and the performance of
player’s on free agent deals during that year. I was also able to find a positive
relationship between improvement over the average performance in the previous
season and that player’s performance the following year. This self-efficacy control is
unique, and the control variable, or perhaps a similar variable with the same idea
behind it, could become a significant part of sports economics moving forward.
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Appendix
Key:
*=10 percent significance level
**=5 percent significance level
***=1 percent significance level
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Table 1: First Model Results
Source

SS

Model

237.276249

Residual

395.227029

Total

632.503278

war

Coef.

adjgames

0.02***

yrsleft

0.24***

logsalary

0.19

logtmoney

-0.08

record

7.99***

prevrec

-2.25

age

-0.01

age2

-0.00

lastyear

-0.31

improve

.40

_cons

-5.24

N

180

R2adj

.34

Table 2: First Model Heteroskedasticty Test: Breusch-Pagan

chi2(1)

=

6.56**
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Table 3: First Model Multicollinearity Test
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

logtmoney

4.91

0.21

logsalary

3.80

0.26

yrsleft

1.71

0.59

prevrec

1.22

0.82

adjgames

1.24

0.85

record

1.17

0.86

lastyear

1.13

0.89

improve

1.130

0.91

Mean VIF

2.15

Table 4: Second Model Results
Source

SS

Model

278.448392

Residual

354.054885
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Total

632.503278

war

Coef.

adjgames

0.02***

yrsleft

0.09

avgwar

0.46***

improve

0.50**

record

7.97***

prevrec

-2.37

lastyear

-0.20

age

0.21

age2

-0.00

_cons

-6.55

N

180

R2adj

.41

Table 5: Second Model Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for
heteroskedasticity
Ho: Constant variance
Variables: fitted values of war

chi2(1)

=

10.07***

Table 6: Second Model Multicollinearity Test
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Variable

VIF

1/VIF

yrsleft

1.42

0.70

avgwar

1.39

0.72

adjgames

1.21

0.82

prevrec

1.21

0.83

record

1.16

0.86

lastyear

1.12

0.89

improve

1.11

0.90

Mean VIF

1.23

Table 7: Third Model Results
ops

Coef.

cops

0.81***

age2

0.00

age

-0.05

yrsleft

-0.00

record

0.34**

prevrec

-0.12

lastyear

-0.01

confidence

0.01

_cons

1.06

N

102

R2adj

.30

36

Table 8: Third Model Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan
chi2(1)

=

7.00***

Table 9: Third Model Multicollinearity Test
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

yrsleft

1.31

0.76

cops

1.28

0.78

prevrec

1.2

0.83

record

1.16

0.87

lastyear

1.13

0.89

confidence

1.07

0.93

Mean VIF

1.19
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